Dietmar Harhoff Does the Instrument of Opposition During the Patent Filing Process Need to Be Improved?

Dietmar Harhoff is Director at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich where he heads the department of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research. Furthermore, he is an Honorary Professor for Entrepreneurship and Innovation at the Ludwig Maximilian University Munich. Harhoff’s research focuses on innovation research, entrepreneurship, intellectual property and industrial economics and has been published in a large number of renowned journals. He also serves as a scientific advisor for public and private organizations and chairs the Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation that has been appointed by the German Federal Government. Furthermore, he is an elected member of the German Academy of Science and Engineering (acatech), the German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina and the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (BAdW).

Area of Research

Innovation Research and Management, Entrepreneurship, Strategic Management, Empirical Economics, Industrial Economics, Corporate Finance, Empirical Methods/Econometrics and Statistics, Economic Policy

Dietmar Harhoff, Georg von Graevenitz and Stefan Wagner. "Conflict Resolution, Public Goods and Patent Thickets." Management Science 62, 3 (2016): 704-721.  

since 2014

Director

Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

Research Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation

since 2013

Director

Max Planck Society (more details)

Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law

since 1998

Director

Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

Entrepreneurship Center

2010

Visiting Professor

Stanford University

Department of Economics and Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research

2007-2011

Research Professorship

Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

2007-2011

Research Dean

Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

Munich School of Management

2005-2007

Dean

Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

Munich School of Management

2001

Visiting Professor

University of Cambridge

Sloan School of Management

1998-2013

Professor

Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

Faculty of Business Administration

1997-1998

Research Professor

Berlin Social Science Centre (WZB)

1995-1998

Associate Scientific Director,

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Corporate Taxation and Public Finance

1993-1995

Assistant Professor

University of Mannheim (Universität Mannheim)

1993

Visiting Scholar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Sloan School of Management

1991-1993

Senior Researcher

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

1985

Research Engineer

Institute for Production Systems and Design Technology (IPK)

1984

Visiting Scientist

University of Birmingham

Department of Mechanical Engineering

1996

Habilitation in Economics

University of Mannheim (Universität Mannheim)

Faculty for Economics and Statistics

1991

PhD in Philosophy

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Sloan School of Management

1987

Master of Public Administration

Harvard University

John F. Kennedy School of Government

1984

Diplom in Mechanical Engineering

Technische Universität Dortmund

Department of Mechanical Engineering

- Academy of Management

- American Economic Review

- Econometrica

- Economics of Innovation and New Technology

- Empirical Economics

- European Economic Review

- ifo-Studien

- International Journal of Industrial Organization (IJIO)

- Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik

- Journal of Banking and Finance

- Journal of Empirical Finance

- Journal of Engineering Technology Management

- Journal of Labor Economics

- Journal of Population Economics

- Management Science

- RAND Journal of Economics

- Regional Science and Urban Economics

- Research Policy

- Review of Economics and Statistics

- Small Business Economics

- Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung (ZfbF)

- Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (ZfB)

- American Economic Association (AEA)

- Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London

- Center for Economic Studies (CESifo), Munich

- European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE)

- European Economic Association (EEA)

- Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London

- Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaftslehre e.V. (VHB)

- Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS)

- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim

Prizes

- Schumpeter School Award for Corporate and Economic Analysis (2013)

- MIT Sloan School of Management Dissertation Award (1991)

- Doctoral Scholarship Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1987-1991)

- McCloy Scholarship (1985-1987)

- Stipend, Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes (1980-1984)

- Abitur Award Abiturientenvereinigung Ahlen e.V. (1978)

Fellowships

- Elected Member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (BAdW) (2015)

- Elected Member of the German Academy Leopoldina (2010)

- Elected Member of the German Academy of Science and Engineering (2008)

© Maximilian Dörrbecker

Max Planck Society


"The Max Planck Society is Germany's most successful research organization. Since its establishment in 1948, no fewer than 18 Nobel laureates have emerged from the ranks of its scientists, putting it on a par with the best and most prestigious research institutions worldwide. The more than 15,000 publications each year in internationally renowned scientific journals are proof of the outstanding research work conducted at Max Planck Institutes – and many of those articles are among the most-cited publications in the relevant field." (Source)

Institute

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition was founded in Munich in 1966 as the Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law. During the following decades, it became instrumental in the development of the areas of law that it dealt with. In 2002, in conjunction with new appointments, its scope of research was extended to include core areas of antitrust law and tax law - hence, the change of the Institute’s name to the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law. After the establishment of an additional department for financial economics in 2008, this Institute was replaced, with effect from January 1, 2011, by the MPI for Intellectual Property and Competition Law and the MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance. Together with the MPI for Foreign and International Social Law, these two Institutes form the Munich-based Max Planck Campus for Legal and Economic Research. In 2013, the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law was expanded to include a new, economics-oriented department (Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research); in 2014 the Institute changed its name to Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition. (Source)

Map

Patents are a very useful tool for supporting innovations by setting incentives for companies to invest in research and developments. However, only those innovations should be protected by a patent that are truly inventive. Otherwise, patents might actually end up stifling innovations rather than supporting them. This happens in the case of patent thickets where there are overlapping patents that block each other. DIETMAR HARHOFF explains that this situation should be avoided by the mechanism of opposition: After the patent is granted by the patent examiner, third parties have the opportunity to oppose the examiner’s decision. As described in this video, the researchers used graph theory to analyze patent thickets involving three companies to uncover in which situations this instrument fails. Their findings indicate that, if a patent holder is embedded in such a thicket, they are less likely to challenge a patent application to avoid an escalation between the parties that might end up in court. Furthermore, if there is a large number of companies that could oppose a certain patent, the incentive for any of these companies to oppose is reduced as only one of them has to shoulder the costs of the process while all of them benefit.

LT Video Publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.21036/LTPUB10333

Conflict Resolution, Public Goods and Patent Thickets

  • Dietmar Harhoff, Georg von Graevenitz and Stefan Wagner
  • Management Science
  • Published in 2016

Chicago

Dietmar Harhoff, Georg von Graevenitz and Stefan Wagner. "Conflict Resolution, Public Goods and Patent Thickets." Management Science 62, 3 (2016): 704-721.